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Johnson: Private Placements: Will FINRA Sink in the Sea Change?

PRIVATE PLACEMENTS: WIL FINRA SINK IN THE SEA
CHANGE?
Jennifer J Johnson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Private placements take place when a company sells securities outside
of the normal public securities markets. Today, private offerings
outpace their public counterparts both in terms of numbers and dollar
volume. While sales to institutional investors represent the largest
volume of these sales, nonpublic securities are also sold to retail
purchasers. In today's low interest rate climate, alternative investment
opportunities promising a fairly high rate of return are attractive to
investors who were previously content with safer alternatives such as
corporate or treasury bonds.2 Nevertheless, most retail investors do not
independently seek to purchase securities in nonpublic offerings.
Instead, they enter these investments upon the recommendation of
intermediaries, including stockbrokers and investment advisors. 3
Stockbrokers are regulated by the self-regulatory organization known as
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), while investment
advisors are regulated either by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or state securities authorities. As events have
unfolded, the regulations and enforcement procedures applicable to the
intermediaries provide the only real protection to investors who
purchase private placements.
This Article examines the burgeoning growth of private placement
* Dean & Erskine Wood Sr. Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland,
Oregon. I would like to thank Alex Tinker, JD Lewis and Clark Law School 2014, for his invaluable
research assistance.
1. The term "retail investor" as used in this paper means individual or household investors as
opposed to institutions such as banks, pension funds, and insurance companies. Retail investors may or
may not qualify as accredited investors under SEC rules. See infra note 26.
2. For example, Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin recently subpoenaed bank
records to investigate sales of risky high yield alternative products to senior citizens. Deirdre
Fernandes, Galvin Subpoenas Banks for Details, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 2013, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/10/secretary-state-william-galvin-subpoenas-big-banksand-investment-firms-probing-sales-alternative-assetsseniors/CKYc5JRyVgTsA21cUSYdLM/story.html; see also Nathaniel Popper, Speculative Bets Prove
Risky
as Savers Chase Payoff, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.
10,
2013,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/1 /business/wave-of-investor-fraud-extends-to-ordinary-retirementsavers.html?pagewanted=all&r=0.
3. A recent SEC study demonstrates that retail investors often lack financial literacy and depend
upon broker/dealers and other financial advisors for investment advice. SEC, STUDY REGARDING
FINANCIAL

LITERACY

AMONG

INVESTORS,

vii-viii,

(Aug.

2012),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-partl.pdf.
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activity in the United States securities markets and FINRA's role in
policing the private placement activity of its registered broker/dealer
firms and associated sales representatives. In Part II, the Article
presents a brief overview of FINRA and its status as a Self-Regulatory
Organization (SRO). In Part III, the Article chronicles the federal
regulatory scheme that allows private placements to escape virtually all
governmental scrutiny. Part III also explains the regulatory and judicial
developments that have simultaneously eased the regulation of private
placements while making it more difficult for injured investors to
recover their losses. In Part IV, the Article presents empirical data on
the size and scope of the private placement market, particularly as it
impacts retail investors. This data clearly demonstrates that private
offerings are the predominant method of capital formation, both in terms
of the raw numbers of offerings and total dollar volume. Part V details
two new FINRA rules designed to protect investors who purchase
private offerings from their brokers. Part VI presents empirical data on
FINRA enforcement activity in the private placement arena in the past
decade. The data shows that until very recently, FINRA's enforcement
efforts have been quite poor. Part VII concludes with the observation
that, as the only private placement cop on the beat, FINRA must take its
regulatory responsibilities most seriously. With new initiatives such as
CrowdFunding and advertised private offerings, Congress is imposing
ever-increasing enforcement responsibility upon the SRO. FINRA must
resist the inevitable industry pressure and enact and enforce sensible
rules to protect investors.
II. THE ROLE OF FINRA
Many retail investors who directly enter the securities markets utilize
the services of an intermediary-either a broker/dealer or a Registered
Investment Advisor (RIA). 4 RIAs are governed by the 1940 Investment
Advisers Act5 and regulated by the SEC or state securities regulators,
depending upon the size of assets under management.6 Broker/dealers
4. Far more retail investors invest indirectly through intermediary investment vehicles such as
mutual funds or pension plans. See, e.g., Brian Cartwright, SEC Gen. Counsel, Address Before the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics: THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES
at
2007),
available
24,
(Oct.
REGULATION
http://secsearch.sec.gov/search?utf8=-/E2%9C%93&sc-O&query-brian+cartwright+future+of+securiti
es&m=&affiliate=secsearch&commit=Search (explaining that retail stock "ownership now is
increasingly intermediated by mutual funds and other collective vehicles"); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the
Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 PA. LAW REv. 1961 (2010) (suggesting reforms to the
regulation of collective pool intermediaries).
5. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 80b-1-21 (2006)).

6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss2/4
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are governed by the provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act7
and regulated by both the SEC and FINRA. FINRA is an SRO
established in 2007 through the consolidation of the regulatory functions
of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 8 Among its regulatory undertakings,
FINRA promulgates and enforces rules; enforces federal securities laws
and regulations; and operates a mandatory arbitration system for
disputes between broker/dealers and their customers, as well as disputes
among FINRA members. 9 Soon FINRA will take on additional
responsibility as the regulator of CrowdFunding intermediaries
including broker/dealers and the newly established Funding Portals.' d
In addition, FINRA makes no secret of the fact that it would like to
replace the SEC as the regulator of RIAs, and the SRO has engaged in
an intense Congressional lobbying effort to attain this status.11
FINRA is a very large and quite powerful SRO, despite some
evidence that in terms of raw numbers, the broker/dealer community is
shrinking.12 Today FINRA regulates the activities of 4,300 brokerage
firms, over 161,000 branch offices, and approximately 630,000
registered securities representatives. 13 This Article focuses on FINRA's
regulation of one segment of broker/dealer activity: broker/dealers who
participate in the sale of nonpublic offerings, particularly those
conducted under the Rule 506 private placement safe harbor from the
1933 Securities Act.14 While FINRA has attracted many critics," the
124 Stat. 1376, 1576-77 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3a (West 2013)).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-pp (2006)).
8. Maloney Act, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-3
(West 2013)); (creating Self-Regulatory Organizations); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to
Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the
Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Release
No.
34-56145,
File
No.
SR-NASD-2007-023
(July
26,
2007),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf.
9. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(a), (b).
10. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-05, 126 Stat 306,
315-23 (2012).
11. Melanie Waddell, Ketchum's Big SRO Omission, INVESTMENT ADVISOR (Feb. 25, 2013),
available at www.advisorone.comi/2013/02/25/ketchums-big-sro-omission (explaining that FINRA is
shifting its SRO lobbying effort to the Senate); Bruce Kelly, FINRA Outlines Expansion, INVESTMENT
NEWS, May 28, 2012, at 1. Recently FINRA made its arbitration forum available on a voluntary basis to
RIA disputes. See FINRA, GUIDANCE ON DISPUTES BETWEEN INVESTORS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
WHO
ARE
NOT
FINRA-REGULATED
FIRMS,
available
at
http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/arbitration/specialprocedures/pl 96162.
12. Bruce Kelly, Choppy Waters Persist,INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 21, 2013, at 10.
13. FINRA, 2012 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 8, available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p291721.pdf.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Ben Protess, Finra Executives Get Big Payday, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 1,
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SRO is, for better or worse, the only national cop on the beat to police
private placements.' 6
III. REGULATION OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
In a private placement, an issuer sells securities outside of the public
securities markets pursuant to an exemption from Section 5 of the 1933
Securities Act.17 Section 5 of the 1933 Act provides that issuers must
register all offers and sales of securities in interstate commerce with the
SEC or find an exemption from registration.' 8 The private placement
exemption is contained in section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, which
exempts nonpublic offerings.19 As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, however, the section 4(a)(2) exemption is only available for
offers and sales to sophisticated investors who can "fend for
themselves." 20 According to the Court, private placement investors
must have access to "the kind of information which registration would
disclose" and the business sophistication to understand it.2 1 Dissatisfied
with the uncertain, subjective nature of Ralston Purina'stest of investor

2011, 10:54 AM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/finra-executives-get-bigpayday/; Steven M. Davidoff, The Government's Elite and Regulatory Capture,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(June 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/1 1/the-govemments-eliteand-regulatory-capturel; Letter from Angela Canterbury & Michael Smallberg to Chairman and Ranking
Member, House and Senate Comms. (May 29, 2012), available at http://www.pogo.org/ourwork/letters/2012/fo-fra-20120529-finra-investment-advisers.html
(opposing
self-regulation
of
investment advisers).
16. The SEC also polices broker/dealer activity but focuses its limited resources on the 20 largest
broker/dealers, major fraudulent activity, and broker/dealers with dual registration as investment
advisors under the agency's direct supervision. See generally Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the
FinancialIndustry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 Bus. LAW. 679 (2012)
(presenting results of a study of SEC enforcement activities against broker/dealer activities in 1998 and
from 2007 to 2008). For an example of SEC enforcement activities, see John Thomas Capital Mgmt.
Grp., LLC, File No. 3-15255, 2013 SEC LEXIS 922 (Mar. 22, 2013) (SEC charges brokerage firm
founder and fund manager with fraud); Mark Schoeff, Jr., Dually Registered Advisers in SEC Sights,
INVESTMENT
NEWS,
(Mar.
3,
2013),
available
at
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130303/REG/303039963#.
17. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(2), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77d(a)(2) (West 2013)); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
19. Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving a public
offering." 15 U.S.C.A. §77d(a)(2) (West 2013). Until the 2012 JOBS Act Amendments, section 4(a)(2)
was known as section 4(2). See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
§§ 201(b), 126 Stat 306, 314 (2012).
20. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
21. Id. at 126-27. Cases subsequent to Ralston Purinahave clarified that the disclosure test is
disjunctive and that issuers could meet the section 4(a)(2) exemption of the 1933 Act either by
disclosing information to sophisticated investors or providing effective access to the relevant
information. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt., 545 F.2d 893, 904-06 (5th Cir. 1977).
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sophistication 2 2 small business issuers, their attorneys, and their
lobbyists convinced Congress, 23 and then the SEC, to adopt an
objective, more predictable test for the private placement exemption. In
1982, after a few false starts, 24 the SEC adopted Rule 506 of Regulation
D to provide a safe harbor for private offerings under section 4(a)(2) of
the 1933 Act.2 5 Rule 506 exempts sales to defined "accredited
investors" from 1933 Act registration. In general terms, Rule 506
defines accredited investors as institutional investors of a certain size
and individuals deemed to be wealthy, at least by 1982 standards. 26 The
theory, perhaps belied by recent events, 27 is that accredited investors do
not need the full protection of the federal securities laws because they
have either the sophistication or the resources to both obtain disclosure
and evaluate the merits of private securities offerings. 28 In fact, in
keeping with this self-help rationale, the SEC does not review private
22. Ralston Purina followed an earlier SEC interpretation of then section 4(2) by the SEC's
General Counsel stating that "the determination of what constitutes a public offering is essentially a
question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances are of moment." Letter of General Counsel
Discussing the Factors to be Considered in Determining the Availability of the Exemption from
Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) $ 2,740 at 2,744 (Jan. 24, 1935). After Ralston Purina,the SEC further contributed to
the uncertainty of the Ralston Purinatest by enumerating a number of factors that should be taken into
account in assessing the availability of the section 4(2) exemption. See Non-Public Offering Exemption,
Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (Nov. 6, 1962).
23. Congress responded with a statutory exemption for annual sales of no more than $5 million
to "accredited investors." Small Business Issuer's Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94
Stat. 2294 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2006)). The amendments defined "accredited investor" to
include specific institutional investors and individuals of a certain wealth or sophistication as permitted
by SEC rule. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012).
24. See Mark A. Sargent, The New RegulationD: Deregulation,Federalismand the Dynamics of
Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 225, 236-42 (1990) (summarizing the SEC's prior attempts to
promulgate an acceptable private placement safe-harbor rule).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2011). Under Rule 501(a) the term "accredited investor" includes
insiders, large institutional investors, and natural persons who have an annual income in excess of
$200,000 ($300,000 with their spouse) or at least $1 million dollars in net assets excluding the value of
their primary residence. Id.
27. For example, Bernie Madoff's investors consisted of wealthy individuals, hedge funds, and
institutional investors including charities, all defined as "accredited" under Rule 501(a). See Felicia
Smith, MadoffPonzi Scheme Exposes "The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor", 40 U. BALT. L. REV.
215, 233-34 (2010). Investor losses as a result of the Madoff fraud, however, were legendary. For one
account of the victims and their losses, see Annelena Lobb, For Victims, Downsized Lives and Many
available
at
PM),
11:59
29,
2009,
(June
WSJ.COM
Shattered Dreams,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl24623313963566369.html.
28. The premise that wealth is an appropriate surrogate for sophistication is controversial. See
generally Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 299-301 (1994) (criticizing rules that
equate wealth with sophistication); Manning Gilbert Warren II, A Review ofRegulation D: The Present
Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382
(1984) (arguing that wealthy investors may not have the sophistication to evaluate the merits and risks
of private placement investments).
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placement offerings even for minimal compliance with its rules. 29
Under Rule 506, there is no mandated disclosure if sales are made
only to accredited investors.30
Rule 506 does contain resale
restrictions,3 1 and as originally promulgated, it prohibited the general
solicitation of investors. Title II of the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (the JOBS Act) required the SEC to amend Rule 506 to
permit advertising and general solicitation.3 3 Consistent with this
mandate, the Commission recently adopted new Rule 506(c), which
allows issuers to advertise private placements if they take reasonable
steps to verify that all purchasers of the securities are in fact
accredited.34
While Rule 503 requires issuers to file a Form D with the
Commission to access the Rule 506 exemption,3 5 failure to file is
deemed an "insignificant deviation" that does not destroy the
exemption.3 6 Form Ds are considered notice filings and historically, the
29. Office of Inspector General, Regulation D Exemption Process Report No. 459, 8 (Mar. 31,
2009) [hereinafter OIG 2009 Report]. The OIG 2009 Report noted that the SEC depends upon the
"honor system" for filers to fill out Form D. Id. at 8-10.
30. See 17 C.F.R. §230.502(b)(1) (2011). Private placement issuers, however, generally provide
disclosures for antifraud purposes, although the quality of the disclosures varies widely.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2011). Privately placed securities are "restricted" in the sense that
they may not be resold without an exemption. Id. The most common exemptions are section 4(a)(1) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(1) (West 2013); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2011); and SEC Rule 144, 17
C.F.R. §230.144A (2011).
32. Originally, Rule 502(c) prohibited general solicitation or advertising, effectively restricting
Rule 506 offerings to those investors with whom the issuer or its selling agent has a pre-existing
relationship. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008).
33. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat 306,
313-14 (2012).
34. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Release No. 33-9415 (July 10, 2013). Section 926 of the 2010
Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt rules that disqualify securities offerings involving certain
"felons and other 'bad actors"' from reliance on Rule 506. In response, the SEC adopted Rule 506(d),
Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule 506 Offerings, Release No. 33-9414 (July
10, 2013).
35. 17 C.F.R. §230.503(a)(1) (2008).
36. Rule 508 provides that the exemption will not be lost for an "insignificant" deviation from
the rule including failing to file the Form D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a) (2008); SECURITIES ACT RULES,
QUESTIONS

AND

ANSWERS

OF

GENERAL

APPLICABILITY,

available

at

http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (Answer to Question 257.07).
Rule 507, however, adopted in 1989, provides that an adjudicated failure to file a Form D will disqualify
the issuer from future use of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a) (2011); Accredited Investor and
Filing Requirements, Release No. 33-6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11369 (Mar. 20, 1989). I have found only one
example of an SEC action against an issuer for failing to file Form D. See SEC v. Ludlum, No. 10-7379
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2011) (order enjoining defendants for, among other things, failing to file a Form D
for a Regulation D offering). On July 10, 2013 the SEC proposed a new rule to establish sanctions for
failure to file a Form D. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the Securities
Act, Release No. 33-9416; Release No. 34-69960; Release No. IC-30595; File No. S7-06-13 (July 10,
2013) [hereinafter Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the Securities Act].
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SEC staff has not reviewed them for regulatory compliance or to address
antifraud concerns.37 In any event, the required form does not give the
Commission the information it would need for a substantive review.
At one time, state securities officials provided the regulatory backup
for reviewing these private offerings that are virtually ignored by federal
officials. In 1996, however, Congress preempted state presale authority
over Rule 506 private placements, 39 thus creating a vacuum in which
even suspicious investment schemes can proliferate below any
governmental radar screen. In an earlier paper, I referred to Rule 506
private placements as a "Regulatory Black Hole."40 Unfortunately, the
North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)
reports that Rule 506 offerings "continue to rank as the most common
product or scheme leading to investigations and enforcement actions by
state securities regulators." 4 1
In addition to state preemption and the new SEC advertising rule
mandated by the JOBS Act, there have been a number of additional
regulatory and judicial developments that have simultaneously eased the
regulation of private placements and made it more difficult for injured
investors to recover their losses.42
For example, the wealth standard that defines "accredited investors"
for natural persons has not changed since 1982, with the exception of
the 2010 Dodd-Frank "do not count the house" amendment. 43 Under
current definitions, investors are accredited if they have a net worth in
excess of $1 million (not including the investor's primary residence) or
an annual income in excess of $200,000.44 In today's dollars, these
37. OIG 2009 Report, supra note 29, at 8.
38. Id. at 50 (comments from SEC Division of Corporate Finance). As amended in 2009, Form
D only requires information concerning the date of first sale, limited information about the issuer, and
recipients of sales commissions. Id. at 6. It is not necessary to file a copy of disclosure statements. See
id. at 20-22 (recommending improvements to Form D). On July 10, 2013, the SEC proposed a number
of new rules, which, among other purposes, are intended to enable the Commission to obtain more
information on Rule 506 offerings. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the
Securities Act, supra note 36.
39. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102(a), 110
Stat. 3416, 3417-18 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(a), (b)(4) (West 2013)).
40. Jennifer J. Johnson, PrivatePlacements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151
(2010).
41. NASAA, Top Investor Threats, availableat http://www.nasaa.org/3752/top-investor-threats/.
42. See generally William K., Sjostrom, Jr., Berle IV: The Future of Financialand Securities
Markets the Fourth Annual Symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations,Law, and
Society: Rebalancing PrivatePlacement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143 (2013); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert. B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the
JOBSAct, 101 GEO. L. J. 337, 349-51 (2013).
43. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (codified as a note to 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (West 2013)).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2011).
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standards equate to a net worth of approximately $2.4 million or an
annual income of approximately $470,000. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank,4 5
the SEC is studying the continued wisdom of the 1982 wealth metrics,46
but previous Commission attempts to increase the wealth threshold have
met stiff resistance from the business community.4 7
Unlike registered securities, private placement securities such as those
issued pursuant to Rule 506 are not freely tradable in the public markets.
Instead, Rule 506 securities are "restricted" and investor resales must
comply with a 1933 Act exemption.4 8 Over time, however, private
securities have become increasingly liquid. For example, Rule 144
removes the resale restrictions for nonaffiliated purchasers of restricted
securities who hold the securities for a certain period of time. 49 Over the
years, the SEC has significantly shortened the Rule 144 holding period.
While at one time a nonaffiliate could not freely trade restricted stock
for three years,o today the holding period is six months for public
company stock and one year for securities of private entities.5 1 Also,
trading platforms have emerged to provide a secondary market for
trading restricted securities.5 2 While not entirely free of SEC and
FINRA oversight, these platforms have not yet been subject to the
extensive regulations that govern exchanges trading the securities of
public issuers. 3 Also, the JOBS Act increased the number of
shareholders who can own stock in a private entity before triggering
1934 Act disclosure and other obligations that apply to public

45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 413(b).
46. On July 10, 2013, the SEC announced that its staff was beginning a review of the appropriate
definition of "accredited investor" and requested comments. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D
and Rule 156 under the Securities Act, supra note 36.
47. See, e.g., Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release
No. 8825, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116, 45126 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2011).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2011).
50. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of
Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-6806, 42 SEC Docket 76
(Oct. 25, 1988) (establishing 3 year rule for nonaffiliates).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (2011). For a detailed explanation of the changes to Rule 144
over the years, see Sjostrom, supra note 42, at 1149-51.
52. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 42 (discussing the emergence of trading platforms
to trade private company shares).
53. But see Sharespost, Inc. & Greg B. Bragger, Release No. 66594, 2012 SEC LEXIS 821
(Mar. 14, 2012) (consent decree requiring that SharesPost maintains a trading platform for nonpublic
securities to register as a broker/dealer and pay $100,000 fine). On March 6, 2013, NASDAQ
announced that it will enter into a joint venture with Sharespost's private company market place
exchange and rebrand it the NASDAQ Private Exchange. NASDAQ OMY and SharesPost to Form
Private
Market,
NASDAQ
OMX
(Mar.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfin?ReleaselD=745594. The NASDAQ Private Market launched
March 5, 2014.
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companies from 500 to 2,000.54 These increased resale options have
lowered the traditional illiquidity discount in pricing the sale of
restricted securities, thus increasing the popularity of private offerings.55
While regulatory changes have lightened the requirements for issuers
to sell securities privately, developments in the liability sphere have
made it more difficult for defrauded investors to recover their losses.
Under federal law, Rule 506 investors' only recognized cause of action
is pursuant to an implied cause of action under section 10(b) 56 and Rule
lOb- 5 s? of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, which prohibit fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.58 Over several
decades and with occasional congressional adjustments, courts have
concluded that to establish a prima facie case under Rule lOb-5, a
private plaintiff must generally plead and prove (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the material misstatement of fact or omission and
the purchase or sale of securities; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation. 59 In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,60
Congress tightened the pleading requirements for Rule 1Ob-5 plaintiffs,
dictating that in order to defeat a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must,
before discovery, state with particularity facts detailing the fraud 6' and
"giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
54. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §501, 126 Stat 306, 325
(2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A)(i) (West 2013)). For an extensive discussion
of the gateways that lead to public company status under the 1934 Act, see Langevoort & Thompson,
supranote 42, at 351-55.
55. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144 and 145, Securities Act Release
No. 7390, 63 SEC Docket 2077 (Feb. 20, 1997) (stating that shorter holding periods should lower the
illiquidity discount inherent in private offerings and reduce the cost of capital).
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2010)).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
58. Before 1995, it was commonly understood that private placement investors could recover
under section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, which provides a negligence-based recovery for purchasers who
are in privity with their sellers. In 1995, however, the Supreme Court, in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,
held that section 12(a)(2) only applied to disclosures utilized in a public offering. 513 U.S. 561, 569-70
(1995). While widely criticized, the Gustafson decision has not been overturned either by the Court or
Congress with respect to private offerings. In an interesting move, however, Congress did mandate that
section 12(a)(2) applies to CrowdFunding cases. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, §§ 302(b), 401(a), 126 Stat 306, 319, 323 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77c(b)(2)(D), 77d-l(c)(1)(B) (West 2013)).
59. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (internal citations omitted); see
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liabilityfor Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 463, 467-71 (2011) (detailing the Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action).
60. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(1), (b)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2010).
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required state of mind" (scienter).62 While motivated by a desire to
thwart abusive class action litigation, 63 by its terms, the PSLRA also
applies to individual suits by plaintiffs alleging Rule 1Ob-5 securities
fraud. While some investors may challenge public company private
placements, most allege fraud in connection with sales by private
issuers." The PSLRA thus imposes a heavy burden for these investors
to establish fraud and scienter without discovery.65 Moreover, under
controlling Supreme Court precedent, private placement investors do not
have a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for participant or aiding and abetting
liability.66
Investors challenging fraud in connection with Rule 506 sales fare
somewhat better in state court. Most state blue-sky laws contain
negligence based liability provisions, and under state law there is a
robust aiding and abetting cause of action.6 To be sure, there can still
be jurisdictional 68 and even constitutional challenges under state
statutes,6 9 and provisions of the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform
62. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007),
the Supreme Court clarified that to successfully plead scienter, "the inference of scienter must be more
than merely 'reasonable' or 'permissible'-it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of
other explanations." Id. at 324.
63. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (discussing "the routine filing of
lawsuits . . . with only a faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action").
64. From 2008 to 2012, approximately 13% of nonfund private placement offerings were by
SEC reporting public companies accounting on average for 2% of the total amount sold. See Vladimir
Ivanov and Scott Bauguess, Capital Raising in the US.: An Analysis of UnregisteredOfferings Using
the Regulation D Exemption, 2009-2012 (July 2013), at 14, 19-20 [hereinafter 2013 SEC Staff Study],
availableat http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf.
65. Plaintiff-friendly theories such as the "fraud on the market theory" presuming materiality in
an efficient market do not apply to the vast majority of private offerings. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224,242-43 (1988).
66. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-78
(1994); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157-58 (2008). In Janus
Capital Group., Inc. v. FirstDerivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), the court held that under Rule
10b-5, "the maker of a statement" for purposes of Rule lOb-5 primary liability is only "the person or
entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it." Id. at 2302. It is possible that Dodd-Frank amendments to section 9 of the 1934 Act
may have inadvertently provided an additional cause of action against broker/dealers. See Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(d)(2)(a), 124 Stat. 1376,
1760 (2010).
67. In an earlier paper I presented an extensive analysis of blue-sky liability for primary and
secondary participants in securities fraud. See Johnson, supra note 59, at 475-85.
68. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 755 F. Supp. 2d 857, 888 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(out of state investors could sue under Ohio blue-sky liability provisions). See Robert N. Rapp,
Misapplicationof the FederalExtraterritorialityPrinciplein Limiting the Scope of Civil Remedies for
FraudUnderState Blue Sky Laws, 39 SEC. REG. L. J. 279 (2011).
69. See, e.g., Houston v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, No. 07-cv-6305(HB), 2008 WL 818745, at *56 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (rejecting commerce clause challenge to application of Oregon securities
statute to out of state defendant).
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Securities Act can dampen the enthusiasm for plaintiffs to bring state
court class actions.70
Historically, when the dispute over a private placement involved a
registered broker/dealer, the investor's only dispute resolution
alternatives were FINRA arbitration or participation in a class action.n
Virtually every investor signs an account form with her broker/dealer
that contains a mandatory arbitration clause. 72 The U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld such mandatory clauses against challenges that they were
impermissible waivers of investors' rights under the federal securities
laws. 73 Under FINRA Rule 12204, investor claims will not be arbitrated
if the investor participates in a judicial class action.74 FINRA rules also
prohibit registered firms from including judicial class action waivers in
their account contracts.7 5
IV. THE DATA: AN EXPANDING PRIVATE PLACEMENT MARKET
In light of these develo Pments, the Rule 506 private placement market
has grown exponentially. While precise numbers are not available, by
any measure the market is very large, reaching into the hundreds of
70. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). SLUSA precludes most class actions based
upon state blue-sky laws. Id. § 101(a). SLUSA does not apply to state securities fraud class actions
resulting from privately placed securities by nonpublic companies or privately placed debt securities. 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) (2006). Plaintiffs' attorneys nonetheless shy away
from state class actions due to the expense of litigating the automatic removal and resulting remand
motions. Moreover, class actions involving over a hundred claimants and $5 million dollars can usually
be removed to federal court under provisions of the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub. L.
No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For an in-depth analysis of the
impact of SLUSA and CAFA on state securities litigation, see Johnson, supra note 59, at 487-92.
71. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to
Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REv. 124 (2005) (explaining and critiquing mandatory FINRA
arbitration).
72. Id. at 131-32.
73. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27, 238 (1987).
74. FINRA Rule 12204(b). This rule also provides that FINRA will not conduct class action
at
12204(a),
available
FINRA
Rule
arbitrations.
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element-id=41 10.
75. Id. FINRA Rule 2268(f) requires broker/dealers to include language in their account
agreements acknowledging that they may not force customers to arbitrate if they are a member of an
ongoing
class
action,
available
at
http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record id=13595&elementid=9955&hi
ghlight-2268#rl3595. The validity of FINRA's class action rule was in question-given a successful
challenge by Charles Schwab before a FINRA hearings panel. The FINRA panel found the rule invalid
under current U.S. Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence. Subsequently, FINRA's Board reversed
the hearings panel and Schwab settled agreeing to a $500,000 fine.
76. Only recently with the advent of mandatory electronic Form D filing requirements have
meaningful statistics become available to calculate the number and volume of Rule 506 private
placements. 17 CFR § 230.503(a)-b).
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billions of dollars each year.7 7
A 2013 study by SEC staff for the Commission's Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis 78 demonstrates that as of 2010, in terms of
aggregate dollar volume, Regulation D offerings had become the
dominant offering method for raising capital in the U.S. 7 9 Table One
shows that from 2010 to 2012, the total dollar volume for all Regulation
D offerings exceeded the volume of any other method of equity capital
formation.80
Table 1: Aggregate Capital Raised in 2009-2012 by Offering Method ($
billions)
1,250

750-

Public debt

Public equity
a 2009

Reg D

I 2010

2011

Rule 144A

RegS+Sec4(a)(2)

w 2012

77. To access the Rule 506 exemption, SEC Rule 503 requires issuers to file a Form D with the
Commission within 15 days after first sale. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(1). Form D solicits information on
the "total offering amount" and the "total amount sold" at the time of filing. SEC Form D, 3, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf. The "total offering amount" should set an upper limit of
the volume of Regulation D offers. Id. at 3, 7. However, issuers can choose "Indefinite" instead of
specifying an offering amount, an option often chosen by private investment pools such as hedge funds.
Id. Issuers who do specify a "total offering amount" must amend the Form D filing if the number
increases by more than 10%. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)(3)(ii)(C), (E). The "total amount sold at the time
of filing" figures sets a floor on the Regulation D volume numbers but may not accurately measure the
actual dollar total as no amendments are required if this number changes, and issuers may file the Form
D before any sales actually take place. Finally, because Rule 508 provides that the exemption will not
be lost for an "insignificant" deviation from the rule, including failing to file the Form D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.508, some issuers do not file a Form D or they fail to amend their filings. The SEC has recently
proposed new rules that would require a closing Form D amendment to state the dollar amount of
securities actually sold in the offering. Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the
Securities Act, supranote 36. The proposed rule also contemplates an advanced Form D for advertised
offerings under Rule 506(c), and it disqualifies issuers who fail to file a Form D form utilizing the
Regulation D exemption in future offerings. Id.
78. Formerly, this SEC Division was known as the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation. See SEC Renames Division Focusing on Economic and Risk Analysis (June 6, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-104.htm.
79. See 2013 SEC Staff Study, supranote 64.
80. Id. at 9. This study calculated the total Regulation D dollar volume utilizing the "total
amount sold" reports in the Form Ds and the Form D/A amendments. Id. at 1. Previously, the Office of
the Inspector General estimated the total dollar volume of Regulation D offers in 2008 at $609 billion.
See OIG 2009 Report, supra note 29, at v, 2, 42 (2009). The OIG used a sample of filings in the last
quarter of 2008 and calculated volume based upon the "total offering amount." Id. at 42.
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Regulation D offers also occur with far greater frequency than any
other financing vehicle. Table 2 presents data on the number of
Regulation D offers from 2009 through 2012 as compared with
alternative financing methods:8 1
Table 2. Number of offerings by type of offering and year
Year

Regulation D

Public equity

Public debt

Rule 144A

Reg S

Other
4(a)(2)

2009

20,841

648

1,930
1,465

1,240
1,607
1,148

294

29,445
30,710

942
1,072
863

1,445

2010
2011
2012

262
97

668
863

31,471

954

1,473

1,302

13

518

Among Regulation D offers, the vast majority are conducted pursuant
to Rule 506.82 Tables 3 and 4 show the number and volume of Rule 506
offers during 2011 and 2012. Included in these statistics are offerings
from small business entities as well as public companies and private
investment pools. Tables 3 and 483 break down the offers according to
size, with a goal of teasing from the data the presence of retail
investors. 84 It is most likely that smaller business entities are
represented in the smaller offering ranges and that retail investors are
the intended target of such sales.85

81. 2013 SEC Staff Study, supra note 64, at 9.
82. My review of Form Ds filed in 2011 and 2012 indicates that over 94% of all Regulation Ds
and section 4(a)(5) offers were pursuant to the Rule 506 exemption, data consistent with other studies.
See id. at 7; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 926 (2011) (finding in a data
sample of Form Ds filed from 9/15/2008 to 10/18/2010 that 94% of Regulation D offers are made
pursuant to Rule 506). In terms of dollar volume, Rule 506 offers accounted for 99% of all Regulation
D offers in 2012. 2013 SEC Staff Study, supranote 64, at 11.
83. Tables 3 and 4 were compiled from Form D filings for 2011 and 2012 as tracked by the
subscription-based Knowledge Mosaic website: http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/net/sm/formd.aspx.
The Form D data in Tables 3 and 4, while the best data available, does not accurately measure all Rule
506 sales. As detailed above, the "Total Offering Amount" column shows the amount issuers hope to
raise at the time of the filing and the "Total Amount Sold" column represents only sales completed by
the time of filing. See supranote 77.
84. In a recent Rule proposal, the SEC is proposing an amendment to Form D to capture this
information. See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 Under the Securities Act, supra
note 36.
85. Institutional investors usually maintain minimum investment parameters. For example,
CalPERS ordinarily has a minimum investment size of $50 Million. General Session Questions &
Answers,
CALPERS
INVESTMENTS,
available
at
www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/general.xml (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). Similarly,
until very recently private equity funds such as Carlyle Group LLP required a minimum investment of
between $5 million and $20 million. See Carlyle Group Cuts Minimum Investment to $50,000 in New
Buyout
Fund,
REUTERS
(Mar.
13,
2013),
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/carlylegroup-fund-idUSL3NOC5OC720130313.
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Table 3: 2011 Rule 506 Offerings
Offering
Amount

Total Offering
Number of
Numers
Amount
Ofrns(billions)

Total Amount
Sold (billions)

$1-$1M

4473

$2.0

$1.1

$1M-$5M

4412

$11.8

$6.7

$5M-$25M

2868

$33.8

$20.5

$25M-$100M

944

$48.8

$26.6

$100M-$500M

522

$130.9

$54.5

$500M-$1B

87

$69.1

$21.8

>$1B

69

$198.0

$16.7

Indefinite

3745

n/a

$251.0

Total

13375

$494.3

$398.9

Table 4: 2012 Rule 506 Offerings
Offering
Amount

Number of
Offerings

Total Offering
Amount
Amont
(billions)

Total Amount
Sold (billions)

$1-$1M

4551

$2.0

$1.1

$1M-$5M

4488

$12.1

$6.8

$5M-$25M

2787

$32.4

$19.6

$25M-$100M

979

$52.1

$27.4

$100M-$500M

451

$118.4

$43.0

$500M-$1B

108

$81.9

$20.5

>$1B

62

$201.1

$201.2

Indefinite

3772

n/a

$250.0

Total

17198

$500.1

$569.2
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Table 5 depicts Rule 506 offers by type of security. As shown in
Table 5, approximately 25% of the Rule 506 issuers are pooled
investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity firms.8 6 While
institutional investors dominate this space, retail investors comprise over
40% of hedge fund purchasers87 and private equity firms now have retail
investors in their sights. 8 8
Table 5: Rule 506 Offers by Type of Security 2011-2012
70%

60%
50%

* Pooled Investment
Funds

40%

Il Equity
30%

2 Debt

10%
0%
2011

2012

V. FINRA RULES REGULATING PRIVATE PLACEMENT BROKER/DEALERS
Available evidence suggests that approximately 15% of Rule 506
offerings utilize registered broker/dealers. 89
This equates to
86. In 2011 and 2012, hedge funds represented approximately 45% of pooled investment fund
issuers; private equity funds represented 24%; and venture capital funds approximately 8%. Similarly,
the 2013 SEC Staff Study reports that during the period 2009 to 2012, hedge funds were the largest
private fund issuers. SEC 2013 Staff Study, supra note 64, at 11.
87. See Citi Prime Finance, InstitutionalInvestment in Hedge Funds: Evolving Investor Portfolio
Construction
Drives
Product
Convergence
10
(June
2012),
available
at
http://citibank.com/transactionservices3/homepage/demo/tutorials4l/IIHFJune2012/files/assets/downlo
ads/publication.pdf
88. Ryan Dezember, Carlyle Group Lowers Velvet Rope-Offering Allows Some People to Invest
as Little as $50,000 With the Giant Private-EquityFirm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at Cl (describing
private equity firm's push to target retail investors).
89. My review of Form Ds for Rule 506 offers in 2011 and 2012 indicates that the use of
broker/dealers ranges from 7% for smaller offerings to 23% for the very largest. Similarly, a FINRA
staff review of a sample of 2010 Form D filings found that approximately 15% of Rule 506 issuers
disclosed the compensation of a broker/dealer in their Form D. Private Placements of Securities,
FINRA
Regulatory
Notice
11-04,
n.7
(Jan.
2011),
available
at
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approximately 2,000 Rule 506 placements per year.90 Until recently,
issuers could not advertise or generally solicit investors for Rule 506
offerings. Under SEC staff interpretations, investors could only be
approached about a specific investment if they first prequalified as
"accredited investors."91 As I have explained in an earlier paper, the
SEC restrictions on general solicitations in Rule 506 offerings had the
impact of channeling retail offers through registered broker/dealers due
to their preexisting relationships with accredited investors.92 In 2013,
however, the SEC removed the advertising ban, thus allowing issuers to
advertise directly to investors if they choose. 93 It will be interesting to
see how many issuers take advantage of this new freedom. Given the
investor verification requirements in the adopted rule, there is some
likelihood that issuers who seek retail investors through advertising will
vet their offers and solicitations though an established broker/dealer
network that has experience in prescreening investors. 94 In such cases,
FINRA will have the responsibility of policing the advertised private
placements. 95 Soon, FINRA will take on the added obligation to
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p 122787.pdf.
The
2013 SEC Staff Study reports that intermediaries are used in only 13% of new Regulation D offerings
up to $1 million from 2009-2012 and 18% for offerings of more than $50 million. SEC 2013 Staff
Study, supra note 64, at 17. Professor Campbell, in a study of Form D filings from October 2008
through October 2010, found that 5.8% of issuers raising less than $1 million utilized financial
intermediation compared to 12.7% for offers from $1-5 million. Campbell, supra note 82, at 931.
90. These statistics lead to an interesting question: if not broker/dealers, who is marketing the
majority of private offerings? Some undoubtedly are sold directly by the issuers using available
connections in the accredited investor community. Others may enter the market through investment
advisor recommendations. Unregistered "finders," however, may market far more private placements.
See, e.g., Ranieri Partners LLC & Donald W. Phillips, Release No. 3563, 2013 SEC LEXIS 971 (Mar. 8,
2013) (private equity firm and a partner agreed to $450,000 fine for utilizing unregistered finder and
finder agreed to bar from securities industry). NASAA reports that state regulators brought more than
1,500 actions in 2011 and 2012 involving unregistered placement firms or individuals who marketed
securities in violation of state laws. N. Am. Secs. Admin'rs Ass'n, NASAA Enforcement Report (Oct.
2012), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2012-Enforcement-Report-on2011-Data.pdf; N. Am. Secs. Admin'rs Ass'n, NASAA Enforcement Report (Oct. 2013), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/enforcement-legal-activity/enforcement-statistics. As the SEC
and state regulators clamp down on unregistered finders, FINRA may witness an increase in registered
broker/dealer private placement activity.
91. See, e.g., Use of Electronic Media, Release No. 33-7856, 65 FR 25843, 25851-52 & nn.7980 (Apr. 28, 2000).
92. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 993, 1009 (2012). See also, Langevoort & Thompson, supranote 42.
93. See supranotes 33 to 42 and accompanying text.
94. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 34 (issuers can rely upon broker/dealer verification of
accredited investor status).
95. Broker/dealers who participate in Rule 506(c) advertised offerings are subject to FINRA
rules regulating communications with the public. See FINRA Rule 2210. Depending upon the content
of the solicitation materials, they could constitute a "recommendation," thus also implicating FINRA
suitability rules. See supra notes 33 to 42 and accompanying text.
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regulate broker/dealers who participate in CrowdFunding under Title III
of the JOBS Act as well as regulating the non-broker/dealer "Funding
Portals."96 Preliminary evidence suggests that the private placement
broker/dealer community will participate vigorously in the
CrowdFunding space.97
When an issuer employs a broker/dealer to market a private
placement, the offering becomes subject to FINRA rules.98 Recently,
the SEC has approved two major rules that implicate broker/dealer
participation in private placements: FINRA Rule 2111: Suitability and
FINRA Rule 5123: Private Placement of Securities.
A. FINRA Rule 2111: Suitability
FINRA's Rule 2111: Suitability, effective July 9, 2012, requires
broker/dealers to undertake three layers of suitability analysis when
recommending securities products, including private placements, to
retail customers. 99 First, the broker/dealer must investigate whether the
product is suitable for any investor, an analysis that FINRA labels
"Reasonable Basis Suitability."100 Next, the broker/dealer must find the
product suitable for a particular customer, obligations that FINRA calls
"Customer-Specific Suitability" and "Quantitative Suitability."'
In
Regulatory Notices explaining Rule 2111, FINRA states that many
obligations imposed by Rule 2111 merely codify FINRA, SEC, and
judicial interpretations of pre-existing FINRA rules as well as the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 1 02 Other provisions
96. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat 306,
316 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d-1(a)(2) (West 2013)). Under the CrowdFunding
provisions of the JOBS Act, issuers can target nonaccredited investors, but they may not advertise. Id.
Instead the statute requires the use of intermediaries who are allowed to engage in general solicitation.
Id.
97. Mohana Ravindranath, For Broker/Dealers, Crowdfunding Presents New Opportunity: An
Exemption in the Securities Act Lets Start-ups Sell Securities to Unlimited Accredited Investors, WASH.
POST (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/for-brokerdealerscrowdfunding-presents-new-opportunity/2013/03/28/bb835942-8075-l le2-8074b26a87lbl65a story.html.
98. FINRA will also regulate the new CrowdFunding portals. See Release 33-9470, 2013 SEC
LEXIS 3346 (Oct. 23, 2013).
99. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Release No. 63325, 75 FR 71,479, 71,481-82, 71,485
(Nov. 23, 2010) (Order Approving Proposed Rule Change); FINRA Rule 2111.05.
100. 75 Fed. Reg. 71,481; FINRA Rule 2111.05(a).
101. 75 Fed. Reg. 71,481; FINRA Rules 2111(a), 2111.05(b).
102. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rules 2090 (Know Your
Customer) and 2111 (Suitability) in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Release No. 34-62718, 2010
SEC LEXIS 2759, at 17, 78-80 (Aug. 20, 2010). Additional Guidance on FINRA's New Suitability
Rule,
FINRA
Regulatory
Notice
12-25,
1
(July
9,
2012),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/net-file-store/newrulebooks/f/ilFINRANoticel2_25.pdf;
New
Implementation Date for and Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know
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of the Rule, however, impose new or modified responsibilities.' 03
With regard to customer-specific suitability, Rule 2111 expands prior
NASD Rule 2310 to provide additional enumerated factors a
broker/dealer must review in making the decision of whether an
investment is suitable for a particular customer.104 Under Rule 2111, a
broker/dealer must now consider the customer's age, time horizon,
liquidity needs, and risk tolerance, in addition to the customer's other
investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, and investment
objectives as mandated by the previous NASD Rule. 05 Rule 2111 also
imposes a requirement that broker/dealers analyze the Quantitative
Suitability of an investment for a particular customer.'0 6 This provision
requires broker/dealers who have control over a customer's account to
evaluate the customer's entire portfolio in order to have a reasonable
basis for concluding that the investment does not involve excessive
trading.107
Rule 2111 also sets forth an explicit obligation for broker/dealers to
engage in a "Reasonable Basis Suitability" analysis, which is an
important development for the regulation of private placements. Rule
2111 requires broker/dealers to investigate the issuers and their products
to make sure they are legitimate and viable. It also requires the firms to
educate their sales representatives so that they also understand the
products they recommend to their customers.' 0 8 Rule 2111 codifies
FINRA's position that prior FINRA rules and judicial opinions imposed
such due diligence requirements upon broker/dealers that sell private
placements. Previously, FINRA grounded this due diligence obligation
in its interpretations of FINRA Rule 2010, requiring adherence to just
and equitable principles of trade, and FINRA Rule 2020, prohibiting
manipulative and fraudulent practices.' 09 FINRA also asserted that
Your Customer and Suitability, FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-25, 2 (July 9, 2012), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/netfile store/newrulebooks/fli/finra 11-25.pdf.
103. FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra note 102, at 1-2; FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-25,
supranotel02, at 2.
104. FINRA Rule 2111(a). See FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-25, supra note 102, at 3-5; see
generally FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra note 102.
105. FINRA Rule 2111(a).
106. FINRA Rule 2111.05(c).
107. Id. In Regulatory Notice 12-25, FINRA explains that the quantitative suitability obligation
merely clarifies the excessive trading (churning) line of cases under the prior rule. Supra note 102.
108. In Regulatory Notice 12-25, FINRA states that both the broker/dealer and the associated
brokers must understand the product they are recommending. FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, supra
note 102, at 14.
109. See, e.g., Regulation D Offerings: Obligation of Broker-Dealers to Conduct Reasonable
Investigations in Regulation D Offerings, FINRA Regulatory Notice 10-22, 3-5 (Apr. 2010), available
at
http://www.fmra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl21304.pdf.
FINRA also reminded broker/dealers that they could not meet their requirement under then NASD Rule
for customer-specific suitability if they did not understand the product they were recommending. See
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under applicable SEC and judicial precedents, broker/dealers who
recommend a product implicitly represent to the customer "that a
reasonable investigation has been made and that [its] recommendation
rests on the conclusions based on such investigation."o10 Under this so
called "shingle theory," failure to comply with this due diligence
obligation could constitute a violation of the antifraud rules of the
federal securities statutes."' Similarly, FINRA promulgated several
regulatory notices involving broker/dealer due diligence obligations for
particular products such as tenancies in common and hedge funds.1 12
While the requirements embodied in FINRA Rule 2111 may not
break entirely new ground, the rule clearly imposes a more concrete test
of broker/dealer due diligence. The prior underpinnings of the product
due diligence obligation were vague and scattered among FINRA
interpretations of its general fair practice rules and older judicial
decisions.1 13 The precise origins of the obligation proved difficult to
explain to hearing officers even in regulatory proceedings, and private
plaintiffs often failed to convince federal courts that a broker/dealer's
negligent failure to conduct adequate due diligence constituted fraud.' 14
also Non-Conventional Investments: NASD Reminds Members of Obligations When Selling NonConventional Investments, NASD Notice to Members 03-71, 766-77 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.complinet.com/file-store/pdf/rulebooks/nasd0371 .pdf.
110. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d. Cir. 1969); see also SEC. v. Current Fin. Servs., Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000); SEC. v. Great Lake Equities Co., No. 89-CV-70601-DT, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19819, at *16-17 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 1990); SEC. v. N. Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424
F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970).
111. Securities Act of 1933, P.L. 112-106, ch. 38, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a) (West 2013)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
112. See, e.g., Private Placements of Tenants-In-Common Interests, NASD Notice to Members
05-18,
1,
4-5
(Mar.
2005),
available
at
http://www.complinet.com/filestore/pdf/rulebooks/nasd_0518.pdf; Complex Products: Heightened
Supervision of Complex Products, FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-03, 1-2 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl25397.pdf
(listing
"structured notes, inverse or leveraged exchange-traded funds, hedge funds and securitized products,
such as asset-backed securities"); New Products: NASD Recommends Best .Practices for Reviewing
New Products, NASD Notice to Members 05-26, 3 (Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.complinet.com/file store/pdf/rulebooks/nasd_0526.pdf.
113. In previously justifying its due diligence obligation, FINRA frequently cited the case of
Hanly, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969), in which the Second Circuit held that the negligent failure of a
broker/dealer to conduct adequate product due diligence constituted a violation of Rule lOb-5. Id. at
597. Hanly, however, predated the U.S. Court's decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,425 U.S. 185,
212-14 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980), establishing a scienter culpability standard
for both private and governmental actions under Rule IOb-5. Hanly, 415 F.2d 589.
114. See, e.g., BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[M]ere negligent violations of [FINRA] rules are not actionable in federal court;
rather, to form the basis for liability in damages, the broker's violations of the rules must be 'tantamount
to fraud.'"); Brown v. J.P. Turner & Co., No. 1:09-cv-2649-JEC, 2011 WL 1882522, at *4 (N.D. Ga.
May 17, 2011) (broker had no duty to verify information in private placement memorandum); In re
Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 761 F. Supp. 2d 504, 572-73 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(underwriter in a private placement had no duty to conduct "due diligence" or investigate the issuer or
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Rule 2111 clearly establishes broker/dealers' duties and at least provides
regulators with a clear rule to interpret. Moreover, it establishes the
industry standard of care against which aggrieved investors can measure
negligence in FINRA arbitrations. In the rare judicial proceeding,
however, investors may still face great difficulties in parlaying a
negligent violation of the FINRA due diligence rule into a cause of
action cognizable by federal courts."l5
B. FINRA Rule 5123: Private Placements of Securities
FINRA's new Rule 5123, effective December 3, 2012, applies when

FINRA members participate in nonproprietary private placements." 6
Rule 5123 requires broker/dealers to file with FINRA copies of the
private placement memoranda (PPMs), term sheets, and any other
disclosure documents within 15 days after first sale.' 17 The rule
exempts private placements sold solely to institutional purchasers and
other accredited investors who are not natural persons."' Rule 5123 is a
notice filing which will not result in FINRA comments or approvals." 9
Rule 5123 is a pullback from an earlier FINRA rule proposal that
would have expanded existing FINRA Rule 5122 to include all
broker/dealer private placement activity.120 Specifically, Rule 5122
the offering). C.f SEC v. Platinum Inv. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 6093(JSR), 2006 WL 2707319, at *3-5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006) (summary judgment against broker on securities fraud claim where broker
recklessly failed to conduct adequate due diligence).
115. See generally Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A FederalRemedy for
Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 101 (2006) (explaining that brokerage
customers have no federal remedy for incompetent or careless investment advice).
116. A "non-proprietary private placement" refers to an offering in which the broker/dealer is not
itself the issuer of the securities or a controlled affiliate of the issuer. See Notice of Filing and
Accelerated Approval of FINRA Rule 5123, SEC Release 34-67157 (June 7, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2012/34-67157.pdf.
117. FINRA Rule 5123(a). On June 25, 2013, FINRA filed with the SEC a proposed rule change
that would expand the scope of the required filing to include additional information if known by the
broker/dealer. See Proposed Rule Change Relating to Members' Filing Obligations Under FINRA Rule
5123, Private Placements of Securities, (June 20, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Change], available
at http://www.finmra.org/Industry/Regulation/RuleFilings/2013/P285315.
118. FINRA Rule 5123(b). There is no exemption from Rule 5123 for private placements to
accredited investors who are natural persons. In recent guidance, FINRA states that CrowdFunding
offerings under the JOBS Act are not required to be filed pursuant to Rule 5123. FINRA, Sale of
Private
Placements
Frequently
Asked
Questions
(FAQ),
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/RegulatoryFilings/PrivatePlacements/faq/#3-2.
119. Private Placements of Securities: SEC Approves New FINRA Rule 5123 Regarding Private
Placements of Securities, FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-40, 2 (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.finra.org[Industry/Regulation/Notices/2012/Pl63710.
120. See Proposed Rule Change to Adopt New FINRA Rule 5123 (Private Placements of
Securities,
9
(Oct.
4,
2011),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@mlflVdocuments/rulefilings/pl 24598.pdf;
FINRA Requests Comment on Proposed Amendments to FINRA Rule 5122 to Address Member Firm
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requires broker/dealers who participate in proprietary private placements
to make affirmative disclosures to investors of the intended use of
offering proceeds, expenses, and the amount of selling compensation to
be paid.121 In addition, Rule 5122 requires that at least 85 percent of the
offering proceeds be utilized for the business purposes identified in the
offering document.122 Like Rule 5123, Rule 5122 contains a filing
requirement to enable FINRA to conduct post sale reviews. 12 3 FINRA's
proposal to expand Rule 5122 to include nonproprietary private
placements met with heavy industry resistance,124 and as adopted, Rule
5122 only applies to proprietary private placements in which the
broker/dealer, or a controlling entity, serves as the issuer of the
securities.125
Rule 5123, while not containing the affirmative disclosure
requirements and expense limitations initially proposed by FINRA, is a
move forward nonetheless.126 For the first time, there will be a
repository of private placement disclosure documents in the hands of a
regulatory body.12 7 The Rule provides that FINRA will give
confidential treatment to all filed documents and information and that
FINRA will use such documents and information "solely for the purpose
of review to determine compliance with the provisions of applicable
FINRA rules or for other regulatory purposes deemed appropriate by
FINRA."l 28 FINRA has stated that the filings will enable it to provide
additional regulatory oversight of brokers who sell private
placements.1 29 Informally, FINRA has stated that its staff will review
Participation in Private Placements, FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-04, 4-5 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/net-filestore/newrulebooks/fli/fmralI 1-04.pdf.
121. FINRA Rule 5122(b)(1)(A). Rule 5122 governs FINRA members that issue their own
securities in a Private Placement including sales by controlled entities such as pooled investment funds
that utilize a captive broker/dealer.
122. FINRA Rule 5122(b)(3).
123. See FINRA Rule 5122(b)(2).
124. See, e.g., Bruce Kelly, Securities firms fight commission cap for private placements,
INVESTMENT

NEWS

(Mar.

20,

2011),

http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110320/REG/303209977.
125. FINRA Rule 5122(a)(1), (b).
126. On June 20, 2103, FINRA filed immediately effective amendments to Rule 5123 that require
broker/dealers to e-file the required documents though its Gateway system and to answer a series of
additional questions about the private placement in connection with the filing. Proposed Rule Change,
supra note 117.
127. Form Ds, the only previous source of private placement filings, do not currently contain
these disclosures. On July 10, 2013, the SEC proposed amendments to Form D that would solicit
additional information including the intended use of proceeds from all Rule 506 issuers, see
Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under the Securities Act, supra note 36, but these
proposed amendments fall far short of a requirement to file the PPM.
128. FINRA Rule 5123.
129. Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve or Disapprove a Proposed
Rule Change, Release 34-66203 (June 7, 2012); Stan Macel, Assistant General Counsel, FINRA,
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the Rule 5123 filings to find trends in private placement sales. The
filings may provide early warnings and FINRA staff will contact
broker/dealers if something seems amiss. In particular, FINRA intends
to review the filings to "identify and assess higher risk transactions" 30
and ascertain if broker/dealers have complied with their reasonable basis
suitability obligations under Rule 2111.131
At present, it is unlikely that FINRA has adequate staffing to review
all of the private placement material that will be submitted under Rule
5123. Even in the short term, however, FINRA should have the ability
to spot-check the -e-filed materials, and FINRA's examination staff is
likely to review materials prior to compliance inspections and when
investigating compliance complaints.' 32
VI. FINRA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS
Of course, rules and good intentions will be effective only when
coupled with adequate enforcement.' 33 FINRA has announced that the
policing of broker/dealer private placement sales practices will be a
regulatory priority for 2013. 134 Unfortunately, FINRA's enforcement
record to date has been inconsistent at best.

Response
to
Additional
Comments,
2
(May
18,
2012),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/pl26433.pdf.
130. FINRA, Annual Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter, 4 (Jan. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p 197649.pdf.
131. Stan Macel, Assistant General Counsel, FINRA, Response to Comments, 13-14 (Jan. 19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p125430.pdf;
Thomas M. Selman, Executive Vice President, Regulatory Policy, Investment Program Association Fall
Conference (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Selman/P197043.
132. Macel, supra note 129, at 13-14. While FINRA does not control most private placement
issuers, it can make referrals to the SEC or state regulators. Unfortunately the SRO's record of
cooperation has been spotty. Some suggest FINRA fears treatment as a governmental agency if it
engages too heavily with state and federal regulators. See, e.g., Steven Irwin et al., Self-Regulation of
the American Retail Securities Markets-An Oxymoron for What is Best for Investors?, 14 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 1055, 1067-71 (2012).
133. See supra note 16 (describing the SEC's more limited enforcement activity with respect to
broker/dealers).
134. Annual Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter, supra note 130.
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Table 5: FINRA Private Placement Enforcement Statistics
FINRA Enforcement Actions: Private Placements
100
80
60
40
20
0

Table 5 details FINRA enforcement actions against broker/dealers who
engage in private placement sales.' 35 Table 5 clearly demonstrates that
until very recently, FINRA's enforcement of the securities laws, and its
own private placement rules, has been abysmal. For most of the past
decade, FINRA brought very few enforcements actions against
broker/dealers based upon private placement activity. Only after the
public exposure of large-scale private placement frauds in 2010 and
2011 did FINRA bring enforcement proceedings in any meaningful
numbers. 136 Massive losses occasioned by broker-facilitated fraudulent
offerings in Medical Capital, DBSI, and Provident Royalties' 3 7 resulted
in criminal indictments against the principal of the issuers;13 8 federal
135. Table 5 counts an enforcement proceeding against both a broker/dealer firm and one or more
associated representatives as one enforcement action.
136. FINRA reports that in 2011, it received 1,100 customer complaints and opened 250
investigations resulting in 70 enforcement actions against private placement broker/dealers. Macel,
supra note 129, at 10. My research shows that at least 10 of the enforcement actions resulted from the
large-scale Ponzi schemes while another 10 involved selling away cases.
137. Medical Capital Holdings, DBSI, Inc. and Provident Royalties LLC were large syndicators
of private placement offerings that were little more than Ponzi schemes. Investors lost in excess of a
billion dollars in these phony investments. For an in depth description of these fraudulent sales, see
generallyJohnson, supranote 92.
138. In May 2012, former Medical Capital president Joseph J. Lampariello pled guilty to wire
fraud. See Ronald Campbell, President of 'Ponzi-like' Fraud MedCap Pleads Guilty, OC Register,
ORANGE
COUNTY
REG.
(May
7,
2012,
9:59
PM),
available
at
http://
www.ocregister.com/articles/medcap-353057-lampariello-million.html.
In November 2012, Paul
Melbye, cofounder and former chief executive of Provident Royalties, pled guilty to conspiracy to
defraud investors in connection with a $485 million oil and gas promotion. Laurel Brubaker Calkins,
Ex-Provident Royalties CEO Admits Guilt in $485 Million Scam, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:48
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1l-09/ex-provident-royalties-ceo-admits-guilt-in-485PM),
million-scam-l-.html. Other Provident officers recently received prisons terms in connection with the
failed private placements. Bruce Kelley, Bosses ofBroker-Breaker Provident Royalties Get Prison
Time,
INVESTMENT
NEWS
(July
11,
2013),
available
at
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regulatory proceedings against the issuers;
state regulatory actions
40
14
against broker/dealer firms;1 class actions; 1 and a multitude of
FINRA arbitrations.142 In light of the apparent pervasiveness of
broker/dealer participation in these schemes, FINRA could no longer
ignore the problem.
FINRA states that the regulation of broker/dealers who sell private
offerings and other complex products to retail investors will be a
regulatory priority for the SRO. 43 It remains to be seen if FINRA will
carry out its announced agenda through its enforcement actions. 4 4
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has presented data demonstrating that private securities

offerings now dominate all modes of capital formation in the United
States. The new SEC Rule 506(c), permitting advertised private offers,
may further increase the number and volume of these offerings. There
will be increased pressure on broker/dealers to verify accredited investor
statusl 45 and to conduct an appropriate suitability analysis for investors
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2013071I/FREE/130719976. In April 2013, an Idaho grand
jury indicted the principals of DBSI. Bruce Kelly, Officers at Big Three Private Placement Shop
Indicted: Four Executives at DBSI Chargedwith, Among Other Things, Securities Fraud,INVESTMENT
NEWS
(Apr.
11,
2013,
3:24
PM),
available
at
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2013041 I/FREE/130419978.
139. The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Medical Capital and Provident Royalties,
LLC for fraud in 2009. See Second Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws
at 7-24, SEC v. Med. Capital Holdings, Inc., No. SACV 09-818 DOC (RNBx), 2010 WL 809406 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 16, 2010); SEC v Provident Royalties LLC. Litigation Release No. 21118, 2009 SEC LEXIS
2241 (July 7, 2009).
140. A few state regulators brought enforcement actions against broker/dealers that sold the failed
private placements. See, e.g., Administrative Complaint at 1, In re Secs. Am., No. 2009-0085 (Mass.
Sec'y
of
the
Commonwealth,
Sec.
Div.
Jan.
26,
2010),
available at
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/archived/sctsa/sa-complaint.pdf.
141. See, e.g., Billitteri v. Secs. Am., Inc., Nos. 3:09-cv-01568-F, 3:10-cv-01833-F, 2011 WL
3586217, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011) ($80 million class action settlement on behalf of Securities
America customers who purchased private placement investments in Medical Capital Notes and
Provident Royalties).
142. Id. at *2 (explaining $70 million settlement to members of a class of investors who had
purchased Provident and Medical Capital securities through a Securities America broker/dealer and who
had opted to participate in FINRA arbitration).
143. Annual Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter, supra note 130. Similarly, the SEC
had indicated that it will carefully review broker/dealer sales practices impacting retail investors. SEC,
OCIE National Exam Program, Examination Priorities for 2013, at 7 (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2013.pdf.
144. At least one skeptic doubts that FINRA's actions will match its rhetoric. See Bill Singer,
FINRA CEO Ketchum's Speech and the Shortcomings ofSelfRegulation, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2013, 10:12
AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2013/03/15/fmra-ceo-ketchums-speech-andthe-shortcomings-of-self-regulation ("[FINRA's] track record doesn't exactly overwhelm me with a
sense of pre-emptive market intervention or of timely enforcement.").
145. Under Rule 506(c) an issuer is deemed to have taken reasonable steps to determine an
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who learn of private deals online or through other advertising venues.
While private placements sales are currently restricted to defined
accredited investors, recent CrowdFunding initiatives will open a
portion of this market to all investors regardless of wealth. On the one
hand, these new advertised ventures can provide ample opportunities for
increased fraud.146 On the other hand, the advertising materials, private
placement FINRA filings, and required CrowdFunding disclosures will
provide enforcement opportunities as well, albeit not in time to prevent
most investor losses. As FINRA recognizes in its 2013 regulatory and
examination priorities,14 7 the SRO will be right in the middle of this sea
change.
In regulating broker/dealers who participate in private placements (as
well as its role in policing CrowdFunding intermediaries), FINRA
cannot remain asleep at the wheel like it has in years past. 148 The SRO
will have to decide whether to bow to industry pressure or to legislate
and enforce, with investor protection as a primary goal. There is little
doubt that FINRA is now awake, but given its checkered enforcement
history with private placements, the SRO needs to take its increased role
very seriously in this brave new world of advertised offers and retail
investors.

individual investor's accredited status if a broker/dealer confirms that it has taken reasonable steps to
verify that status.
146. In adopting Rule 506(c) permitting advertised private offerings, the SEC recognized the
potential for increased fraud. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 34, at 7-8 ("[W]e recognize the concerns
raised by a number of commenters that a general solicitation for a Rule 506(c) offering would attract
both accredited and non-accredited investors and could result in an increase in fraudulent activity in the
Rule 506 market, as well as an increase in unlawful sales of securities to non-accredited investors.").
SEC Commissioner Aguilar, dissenting from the adoption of Rule 506(c), similarly noted the increased
opportunities for fraud and chided the Commission for adopting the new Rule without mitigating
measures in place. Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, FacilitatingGeneralSolicitation at the Expense of
Investors, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Open Meeting Washington, D.C. (July 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539684712#.Ulym8ZvD9Ms.
147. See Annual Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter, supra note 130, at 4.
148. FINRA is already under industry pressure to "go light" with its CrowdFunding rules.
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